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Abstract 
It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be 
identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result 
has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gkdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then 
B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A - as long as supposing 
obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. 
Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question ‘how to accept a 
conditional?’ has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise 
acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide 
acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide 
a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration. 
First we propose an account of the bu~i(. idea of epistemic conditionality, by studying the 
conditionals validated by epistemic models where iteration is permitted but not constrained by 
special axioms. Our modeling does not presuppose that epistemic states should be represented 
by belief sets (we only assume that to each epistemic state corresponds an associated belief 
state). A full encoding of the basic epistemic conditionals (encompassing all forms of iteration) 
IS presented and a representation result is proved. 
In the second part of the essay we argue that the notion of change involved in the evaluation 
of conditionals is suppositional, and that such notion should be distinguished from the notion of 
updating (modelled by AGM and other methods). We conclude by considering how some of the 
recent modellings of iterated change fare as methods for iterated supposing. @ 1999 Elsevtcr 
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1. Introduction 
(RT) ‘If A, then B’ is accepted with respect to an epistemic state K iff B is accepted 
in the minimal revision of K needed to accept A for the sake of the argument. 
RT is a neat and elegant idea.” How to make it precise has been, nevertheless, the 
object of some controversy. The terms that are left vague in RT are: ‘epistemic state’, 
‘hypothetical revision’, and ‘acceptance’. Different implementations of RT typically 
disambiguate these terms in different ways. I offer a review of some of the basic 
alternatives. 
First consider epistemic states. One common maneuver is to represent them by closed 
sets of sentences (theories in logical parlance). For example, the AGM trio adopted 
this position.3 Sentences in those belief sets represent the sentences that a certain agent 
is committed to believe at a certain time. This move is now common in computer 
science circles, but it is far from being common in philosophy, where epistemic states 
are often encoded as probability functions. 
Richer qualitative encodings of states have been proposed by many authors. Wolf- 
gang Spohn, for example, has advocated in several papers the use of well ordered 
partitions (WOP). Epistemic states can also be represented by Grove orderings (which 
encode more structure than WOPs), or by ordinal conditionaljimctions (which encode 
more structure than the two previous modelings).4 
No substantial assumptions about the structure of epistemic states will be made in 
this paper, aside from the fact that the belief states associated with them are belief 
sets (i.e. closed sets of sentences in a non-modal language). So, to each epistemic 
state E correspond a belief set p(E), representing what is believed by an agent in this 
epistemic state.5 
If E is the current epistemic state and p(E) is its associated belief set, one can use 
the notation E * A to indicate the minimal perturbation of E needed to suppose A. Of 
course with the new state E * A will be associated its coresponding belief set p(E *A). 
What about acceptance? Acceptance of simple Boolean formulae in an epistemic state 
E can now be represented by set theoretical membership in p(E). Peter GIrdenfors pro- 
posed, in addition, to represent acceptance of conditionals with respect to an epistemic 
state E, by set theoretical membership in its associated belief set p(E) [13]. These pro- 
posals identify acceptance of modal and non-modal formulae with belief in the truth of 
2 This idea is usually atributed to Frank Ramsey. Nevertheless Ramsey never endorsed (RT). For historical 
and conceptual details related to this issue see [2]. 
3 See [13] for an introduction to AGM. 
4 This way of representing states has recently gained some momentum. Some representative examples of 
this trend are the elaboration of Sphon’s ideas recently developed by Darwiche and Pearl in [lo] as well as 
the proposal presented by Hans Rott in [29] 
5 Since no fwther restrictions are imposed until the last section of the paper, we can have different epistemic 
states sharing identical belief sets. Many philosophers require the complete determination of epistemic states 
by their doxastic components. This requirement will be discussed in section 5 of this paper, but the main 
representation result proved in Theorem 1 is completely general and therefore it does not depend on such 
constraint. 
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the propositions that they express. This idea, in turn, entails that modal and conditional 
sentences do express propositions and are truth value bearers. 
(GRT) A > B E p(E) iff B E p(E * A).6 
The view of conditionality induced by GRT is now well known. For example, 
now know that GRT cannot be complemented, on pain of triviality, with a test 
negated conditionals (see [ 141): 
(GNRT) ?(A > B) E p(E) iff B $J P(E *A). 
WC 
for 
If the idea of GRT is to provide acceptance conditions for truth-value bearing condi- 
tionals, such a limitation is not surprising. In fact, GRT and GNRT imply that A > B 
is rejected if and only if A > B is not accepted. In other words, the net effect of 
complementing GRT with GNRT is to rule out the possibility of being in suspense 
about a conditional. But, of course, GRT seems to have been conceived in order to 
allow for such possibility. 
Peter Gardenfors showed also in 1131 that there are no non-trivial conditionals gcn- 
erated by GRT when * is AGM. Recent refinements of this result seem to indicate that 
GRT is incompatible with principles of belief change that Ramsey explicitly required 
in his test (see [2] for details). In particular, GRT is incompatible with the following 
intuitive condition: 
(Consisterzt rxpandahifity) If neither A nor -A is in p( E ), then P(E * A) = Cn( p( E ) 
U {A}), where Cn is a classical notion of logical consequence. 
How to interpret these results? Ramsey’s remark in ‘General propositions and causal- 
ity’, can be of some help at this juncture: 
‘Many sentences express cognitive attitudes without being propositions; and the dif- 
ference between saying yes or no to them is not the difference between saying yes or 
no to a proposition [28]‘. 
Two implications of Ramsey’s important remark are worth detailed consideration. First 
Ramsey suggests that one can develop acceptance conditions both for sentences that 
express propositions, and for sentences that, without being propositions, are, nevertheless 
cognitive carriers. This, 1 think, is one of the main insights of the program of prohahilistk 
semantics, inititated by Ernest Adams [ 11. Although Adams thinks that conditionals are 
not truth-carriers, he nevertheless thinks that it is possible to provide a precise and sclf- 
contained theory of acceptance for them. 1 do agree with this view, and my ambition in 
this and other writings is to help to develop a self-contained theory of interpretation fol 
conditionals and other modals, whose ontological status as truth-carriers is at least open 
to question.’ From now on I will use the term ‘epistemic’ to refer to these conditionals.’ 
’ GRT stands for ‘GBrdenfors’ Ramsey test’. 
’ I would like to show also that such a theory can be developed without appealing to any probabrilstlc 
paraphernalia. Moreover, I would like to suggest that a purely qualitative account can improve the perfor- 
mance of the standard probabdistic theories. In fact. probabilistic theories are typically unable to deliver a 
satisfactory account of iteration. 
’ Eplstemic conditionals can be seen as truth-valued propositions, and can therefore be identified wnh set 
of possible worlds, as long as the corresponding propositions are undestood contextually. Such a clew ha\ 
been defended by Lindstrom and Rabinowicz in [20]. 
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Secondly, Ramsey suggests that the form of a theory of acceptance for propositions 
(in this case conditional propositions) does not need to coincide with the form of a 
theory of acceptance for epistemic conditionals. This idea has been less appreciated 
by philosophers, logicians and linguists. But I think that Ramsey’s remark is quite 
right, and I hope that some of the following results will contribute to clarify it. In the 
following sections I will refer to Ramsey’s proposal as Ramsey’s insight. 
We already considered a precise formulation of Ramsey’s test for conditionals. GRT 
obviously provides an epistemic test for acceptance of conditional sentences. But it also 
seems obvious that this particular formulation of the test commits us to considering 
these conditionals as truth value bearing sentences, capable of being the object of 
belief, disbelief or epistemic suspense. So, GRT seems to be best seen as delivering 
acceptance conditions for conditional propositions. 
Conditionals of that sort have been thoroughly (and independently) investigated with 
the tools of possible worlds semantics. In [2] it is shown that some of the standard 
systems of possible worlds conditionals can be reconstructed (without appealing to the 
notion of truth) by supplementing GRT with the axioms of a notion of change recently 
axiomatized by the computer scientists Albert0 Mendelzon and Hirofumi Katsuno [ 171. 
It is not transparent which is the intended interpretation for such a notion (usually 
called update), but some of the possible interpretations seem to have an ontological 
flavor (for example, update fails to satisfy Consistent Expandability).’ 
Therefore, we can conclude that if there are such things as truth-value bearing con- 
ditionals,” GRT delivers acceptance conditions for them. Both negative and positive 
reasons support this view. On the positive side one can count the fact that GRT can 
be used to provide acceptance conditions for the possible worlds semantics condition- 
als. On the negative side, one should count the impossibility results mentioned above. 
These results show the impossibility of reconciling GRT with any theory of change 
motivated on epistemic grounds. 
But the ambition of the probabilistic program in semantics, and its more qualitative 
sequels, has been and still is to develop a self-contained pragmatics, completely neutral 
about the ontological status of conditionals. This is probably the minimal goal of 
this program. More ambitiously, the idea can be also expressed as follows: ‘Even if 
conditionals (or some class of conditionals) lack truth values at all, they have precise 
acceptance conditions. The basic idea of an epistemic reconstruction of conditionality 
is to make these conditions explicit’.” 
y Meek and Glymour have suggested in [27] a distinction between conditioning and intervening that can be 
used to make sense of update and to understand how the operation relates to AGM. Most of the examples 
used to motivate update in the database literature can be modeled in terms of what Meek and Glymour call 
an intervention: i.e. an AGM change not with a proposition E, but with a more complex proposition I which 
is an action to bring about E. 
lo Many philosophers and logicians have expressed doubts about such a possibility. Among others, we 
should count E. Adams, M. Dummett, D. Edgington, A. Gibbard, 1. Levi, J.L. Mackie, etc. 
” One should stress that Ramsey’s idea in his seminal piece is certainly related to this second project, 
rather than to the project of providing acceptance conditions for truth value carriers. 
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The basic building blocks of an epistemic semantics for conditionals (of the kind 
that we want to consider here) have been developed by Mackie et al.” and Peter 
Glrdenfors [ 131. I contributed to develop this tradition in a series of recent papers.’ 
A book-length defense of this view has been recently offered by Levi [24]. 
Some further considerations about GRT can help us to understand how the new 
proposal works. One of the main ideas implemented in GRT is that conditionals and 
Boolean sentences should be treated symmetrically. Since the conditionals studied by 
the theory are presystematically understood as propositions, they are potential objects 
of belief, and therefore the conditionals generated by the test are stored in the he/i</’ 
set p(E), together with the Boolean formulae that the agent in question believes at 
the time. But, once one abandons the idea that the test treats conditional propositions. 
and one focuses on studying the conditionals that merely express the commitments 
jtir change already encoded in E, such a move is no longer methodologically sound. 
One can say instead that each epistemic state has an associated belief set, and that 
it supports the conditionals generated via Ramsey bridges. But in saying so we arc 
tacitly introducing subtle changes in Glrdenfors’ formulation of Ramsey’s test. in such 
a way that the phrase ‘the conditionals generated via Ramsey bridges’, has now a new 
meaning. If s(E) denotes the support SC~ associated with E. the formulation of the test 
is now as follows (the tests only apply to consistent s(E) and unnested comiitioncrl.~ 
4 > B, where both A and B are purely Boolean): 
We should supplement the test with the following three stipulations, explaining the 
relations linking s(E) and p(E). 
(1) If A is a purely Boolean formula, then if A E s(E). then A E p(E), 
(2) s(E) is closed under logical consequence, 
(3) p(E) c s(E). 
The new st~~f$eu’ formulation of the test is now compatible with 
(SNRT) l(A > B) E s(E) 8 B $2 ,o(E *A). 
In addition, the notion* that appears in the test is now consistently expandable, and 
the impossibility results are circumvented. Both tests have been used in order to study 
the logic of non-nested conditionals and non-monotonic notions of consequence [3]. But 
they share a limitation with their probabilistic relatives: they do not offer a theory of 
acceptance for nested conditionals. Some researchers have invoked this asymmetry to 
suggest that there is something wrong with the epistemic account. The argument goes 
as follows: ‘we are obviously capable of handling iterated conditionals (of reasonable 
complexity). Therefore any adequate theory of acceptance of conditionals has to be 
able to provide an idealized account of this ability. Since the epistemic approach seems 
unable to do so, we should have suspicions about its general adequacy.’ 
-___ 
‘2 See [21] and [22]. 
” See [I+]. Part of the theory has been developed in collaboration wth Isaac Lew [2]. 
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Responses to this argument have traditionally relied on the denial of its main premise. 
Michael Dummett, for example, in [ 111 says that: ‘we have hardly any use, in natural 
language, for conditional sentences... in which the antecedent is itself a conditional, and 
hence we cannot grasp (their) content . ..‘. Alan Gibbard argued similarly in [15]: on the 
one hand, we have certain forms of iteration that we cannot decipher (like iteration to 
the left). On the other hand, we have other forms of iteration that we can understand, 
e.g. conditionals in consequents. Nevertheless, iterated conditionals of this kind are 
always equivalent to sentences without embedded conditionals. In fact, sentences of the 
form A > (B > C), should be understood, according to this view, as abbreviations of 
sentences of the shape: (AAB) > C. This position has been somewhat prevalent among 
researchers working with probabilistic models of acceptance of conditionals (like [I]). 
I do not think that this response to the realist challenge is fully satisfactory. It seems 
that by denying the existence of embedded conditionals we are seriously crippling a 
general theory of acceptance of epistemic conditionals. Any theory of conditionals has 
to be able to make sense of our capacity to evaluate a sentence like: 
‘If there is no oxygen in the room, then it is not true that if I scratch the match it 
will light’, or 
‘If the light goes on if you press the switch, then the electrician has finished his job.’ 
1.1. Iterated extensions of the Ramsey test 
The stratified versions of the Ramsey test avoid paradox by breaking a symmetry. 
While GRT treats both modal and non-modal formulae symmetrically, SRT fractures 
this symmetry by producing a more sophisticated picture of acceptance of conditionals. 
One can see this fracture as a cautious treatment of a serious problem. Even if con- 
ditionals are not truth carriers, there is a precise manner in which conditional sentences 
are supported by epistemic states. If one wants to preserve caution, support should not 
be conflated with acceptance understood as belief in the truth of a conditional propo- 
sition. So, the epistemic states used in SRT are more complex than the ones used in 
GRT. While the ones used in GRT have only a doxastic component, the ones needed to 
formulate SRT have both a doxastic component (the p-part) and a support component 
(the s-part). 
The apparent strength of GRT resides in its capacity to deal with iteration, which is 
formally reflected by the fact that the test can use p-functions in both sides of the test. 
As we argued above, one must pay a high price for this symmetry: either paradox or a 
change of theme. 
Can one improve the stratified tests in order to allow for iteration? In this essay 
I consider what I believe is an evident strategy: restoring symmetry at the level of 
the support functions. One can appeal to the following iterated modifications of the 
stratified tests: 
(ISRT) A > B E s(E) iff B E s(E *A). 
(ISNRT) +A > B) E s(E) iff B g’s(E *A). 
The tests only apply in the case in which s(E) is consistent and B is in L _. The 
logic of iterated epistemic conditionals can then be studied as usual by appealing to 
epistemic models (EM). An epistemic model is a quadruple (E. p.s, *) =. N where * 
is a belief revision function obeying (ISRT) and (ISNRT), E is a set of cpistemic 
states closed under revision, p is a belief function, mapping each member E of E to 
a belief set P(K), and s a support function, mapping belief states to the sets of all 
formulae that these states support. A conditional sentence C is valid in A4 if and only 
if C E s(K), for every K in E. 
The main motivation of this article is to use the EMS in order to provide firm 
foundations for the study of iterated epistemic conditionals. 
1.2. Basic rpistemic conditionals 
Models of iterated belief revision have recently proliferated. Typically. the ACM 
framework is either extended or revised in order to accommodate special axioms that 
legislate on iterated revisions. Then, the Ramsey schema is used to study the conditional 
reflection of the special constraints on iteration. 
Perhaps the most controversial models arc the ones that allow for conditional up- 
dating. What should count as the minimal perturbation of the current epistemic state 
to ‘suppose’ A > B? Here ‘supposing’ cannot be ‘supposing true’, because this will 
commit us to the idea that conditionals are, after all, truth-bearers. Perhaps ‘supposing’ 
should be equated in this case with certain kind of fantasizing according to which 
the current epistemic state is transformed into another state supporting the ‘supposed’ 
conditional.” It is less clear in what sense this transformation can be constructed as 
a minimal perturbation of the current cpistemic state compatible with that shift.” 
Even if one focuses only on conditionals iterated to the right, there is little agreement 
about the correct principles of iterated change that go with the Ramsey test. Most of 
the theories of iteration in the literature seem too domain dependent to be considered 
as universal constraints on iterated supposing. Actually, the very distinction between 
belief change and change for the sake of the argument is often overlooked, which 
makes the matter even more obscure. 
So, our strategy in this paper will follow the cautious line proposed by Brian Chcllas 
in his paper ‘Basic conditional logic’.‘” In this paper Chellas did not try to provide 
a substantive theory about some particular kind of conditionality ~ counterfactual or 
deontic, for example ~ but to study a basic notion of conditionality common to all 
the substantive theories of truth-valued conditionals. Our aim in the following sections 
will be to study a husk notion of epistemic conditionality. 
“We follow here Let’s idea in [24], pp. 71. 
Ii Two (conflicting) models are provided by Hansson in [16] and Boutilier in 161. Boutilier represents states 
as ordinal functions, and proposes to construct a conditional shift. as the minimal perturbation of the ordinal 
function needed to make the conditional acceptable. 
IhSee [7]. 
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2. Basic epistemic conditionals 
2.1. Logical preliminaries 
Let Lo be a language containing a complete set of Boolean cormectives, including 
the falsum and verum constants I and T. The set of wffs of Lo is defined in the usual 
manner. In addition to LO we consider an operation Cn that takes sets of sentences 
in LO to sets of sentences in LO. Cn is assumed to be a consequence operation, i.e. 
satisfying the classical Tarskian properties, ” as well as finiteness, I8 consistency, I9 and 
superclassicality. In addition Cn is such that for all A, B E LO and K &LO : A + B 
belongs to Cn(K) iff B E Cn(K U {A}). 
Belief states of rational agents will be represented by belief sets satisfying the fol- 
lowing rational constraints: 
A belief set is a subset K of LO which satisfies the following conditions: (1) K is 
non-empty, (2) if A E K and B E K, then (A A B) E K, and (3) if A E K, and A --f B 
E Cn(B), then B E K. 
Let TLO be the set of all belief sets that can be expressed in LO. An expansion of a 
belief set K with a sentence A E LO is the set Cn(K U {A}). K E TL() is consistent if
for some A E LO, A $2 K. 
Nothing substantial will be assumed about epistemic states E aside from the fact 
that their associated belief states p(E) are belief sets. An epistemic state E will be 
called consistent iff its associated belief set p(E) is consistent. 
Let L, be the smallest language such that: ( 1) LO CL, , (2) if A, B E L, , then A > 
B E L, and (3) L, is closed under the Boolean connectives. Let C be an operation 
that takes sets of sentences in L, to sets of sentences in L,. C is assumed to be 
a consequence operation, i.e. satisfying the classical Tarskian properties, as well as 
finiteness, consistency and superclassicality. Of course, Cn C: C and C is the weakest 
conditional extension of C,, i.e. an extension that does not contain conditional axioms 
that are not instances of tautologies in L, In addition C is such that for all A, B E L, 
and KSL, ;A + B belongs to C(K) iff B t C(K U {A}). 
A conditional support set is a subset K of L , which satisfies the following con- 
ditions: (1) K is non-empty, (2) if A E K and B E K, then (A A B) E K, and (3) if 
A E K, and A + B E C(0), then B E K. 
TL, is the set of all conditional support sets. S E TL, is consistent if for some 
AEL>,A@‘S. 
“For any sets K and H, such that K 2 Lo and H C Lo,K C Cn(K), Cn(K) = Cn(Cn(K)), and if K C 
H, then Cn(K) 2 Cn(H). 
“For all X C LO, Cn(X) = U{C(X’): X’ is a finite subset of X}. 
I9 I $S Cn(0). 
2o Cn(0) contains all substitution instances of classical tautologies. 
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2.2. Basic Epistemic models 
An Epistemic model (EM) is quadruple (E,p,s, *). where E is a set (heuristically: 
a set of epistemic states); p is a function p : E - T,.,,; s is a function s : E- T, : 
and * is a function *: E x L, + E. E is closed under revisions and B = Rng(p) is 
closed under expansions. The functions p, s, and * obey the following two constraints 
as well as IRT and INRT: 
(cl) If A E LO and A E s(E), then 4 E o(E). 
W) P(E) c .r(E ). 
(IRT) (A > B) E s(E) iff B E s(E *A), where E is consistent. 
(INRT) 7(A > B) E s(E) iff B q! s(E *A), where E is consistent. 
For every A E L, and every .&’ = (E, p,s, *), A is satiQiahle in .&’ if there is a 
consistent E tE, such that A E s(E). A is valid in M if A E s(E) for every consistent 
E tE. A is valid in a set of models 5’ iff for every model .///’ in S, A is valid in N. 
A is calid if it is valid in all models. Finally A is epistemicall~~ entailed by B in .X 
= (E,p,s, *), iff for every E in E, such that A E s(E),B E s(E). 
Notice that the following constraint can be derived from the previous definition of 
conditional support set, given that C is finite (e.g. compact). 
(~3) s(E) = C( s(E)) 
2.3. S?rl tas 
First we need to define a conditional language smaller than L, Let .&‘?% be the 
smallest language such that if A, B t LO, C. D t BC. then A > B. C > D, -C. CAD E 
.#4%. 
Consider now the conditional system &CM. &CM is the smallest set of formulae 
in the language L j which is closed under (RCM) and (M), and which contains all 
instances of the axioms (I), (CC), (F) and all classical tautologies and their substitution 
instances in the language L, . 
IA>T 
CC ((A > B) A (A > C)) + (A > (B A C)) 
F 1 (A > C) H (A > -C), where C ~2%‘. 
M Modus ponens. 
RCMIftB- C then k (A > B) + (A > C) 
The following completeness result shows the coincidence of the theorems of the 
system 6CM and the conditionals validated by the EMS. 
Theorem 1. A L, .formula A is valid [fl A is a theorem in A CM. 
See Appendix A for the proof. 
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Axiom F encodes a property of basic epistemic models that we can call fullness. 
Fullness establishes that rational epistemic agents cannot be in suspense about condi- 
tionals - they cannot reject both a conditional and its negation. So, fullness should be 
rejected in any modeling of of truth value bearing conditionals. In fact, such models 
treat conditionals as any other truth value carrier, for which suspense should be al- 
lowed.” But, fullness is a typical property of epistemic conditionals.22 In fact, it is 
a mandatory property of epistemic conditionals like the ones studied in the previous 
section, whose negations are understood in terms of lack of acceptance. 
Fullness shoud not be confused with the so-called principle of conditional excluded 
middle: 
(CEM) (A > B) v (A > -23). 
This axiom fails to be validated in our system. Although the agents modelled by our 
theory are logically omniscient and fully introspective, the theory does not require 
the complete determination of the hypothetical state p(E*A) prompted by supposing A. 
Such a state can perfectly well be a (hypothetical) state of partial information. Fullness 
only reflects at the conditional level the fact that * is taken to be a universal response 
sheme to all possible suppositional items. 
Axiom F mirrors syntactically the fact that the EMS implement both a test for ac- 
ceptance (IRT) and a test for rejection of conditionals (INRT). As we said in previous 
sections, one of the advantages of the EMS is that they allow for the implementation 
of both tests (in contrast, GRT and its negative counterpart are, on pain on triviality, 
inconsistent). Some philosophers have argued in favor of renouncing this theoretical 
advantage (see for example Collins’ treatment of indicatives in [S]). Their argument 
can perhaps be reconstructed as follows: ‘There are some conditionals whose status as 
truth carriers is, at least, open to doubt. We think that IRT is a good test of acceptance 
for these conditionals. But we also hope that a theory of truth can be given for them. 
In other words, we see a theory of acceptance for these conditionals as a prolegomenon 
to the construction of this truth-theory (perhaps one can use similar strategies than the 
ones that have been used to go from subjective to objective probabilities). Therefore, 
we do not want to assume from the outset any additional constraint like INRT. In fact, 
assuming INRT (together with IRT) will be tantamount to assume that one cannot 
suspend judgement about conditionals. And we want to live this option open’. 
Such theoretical ideas can be accommodated in our framework by adopting elemental 
epistemic models. They are just basic models where INRT is dropped. 
Let %?J&’ be the smallest set of formulae in the language L, which is closed under 
(RCM) and (M). and which contains all instances of the axioms (1) (CC) in L,, as 
” Suspense here refers to an epistemic scenario where neither a conditional not its negation are accepted. 
I2 One might question fullness on the grounds that agents might fail to be aware of their commitments for 
change. Nevertheless the theory offered here does not intend to describe the actual performance of rational 
agents. but to propose normative constraints on the behavior of rational agents. 
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well as all classical tautologies and their substitution instances in the language L, It 
is easy to see that the formulae validated by the elemental EMS can be axiomatized 
by ??.J?‘. 
Moreover, when we complement the elemental models by 
(Reduction) For every epistemic model (E, p, S, *), and every E in E, s(E) 5 p(E). 
we get exactly Gardenfors’ Belief Revision Models. Gbdenfors’ showed that the syntax 
validated by his models is (exactly) the one axiomatized by %J& (see [13]). 
3.1. Two types qf conditionals? 
Most contemporary theories of conditionals are bifurcated. Arguments for the exis- 
tence of two types of conditionals can be presented concisely as follows: ‘Acceptance 
conditions for one type of conditionals can be given in terms of IRT. Acceptance con- 
ditions for the other kind of conditionals can be given in terms of GRT, or what is 
equivalent, in terms of IRT plus reduction. The latter types are clearly truth bearers, and 
their truth conditions can be independently delivered in terms of possible worlds seman- 
tics. It is not that clear that the conditionals in the former type are truth bearers, but we 
hope that IRT can be used as a heuristic tool to provide truth conditions that suit them’. 
I will refrain from evaluating here the plausibility of this dualism. I would only like 
to remark that, even if one adopts a bifurcated theory, such a view seems to support 
what I called before Ramsey’s insight. In fact, the previous results show that the form 
of a theory of acceptance for conditional propositions (either in the form of elemental 
models or in the form of elemental models obeying reduction) differs from the form 
of a theory of acceptance for carriers of cognitive attitudes like the ones studied by 
the basic models. 
The latent differences between the two theories are only reflected syntactically by 
languages that allow for iteration. In fact, notice that the axiom F is essentially iterated, 
in the sense that it has no non-nested instances. But one must keep in mind that the 
logics validated by the belief revision models and the basic epistemic models coincide 
for non-nested languages (see [3]).23 
4. Extensions of the basic theory 
In the following sections, I consider the pros and cons of extending the basic theory 
with the constraints of well-known notions of belief change. 
Due to its centrality in the theory of theory change, I will start with some important 
rationality postulates used by AGM. 
(Inclusion) p(E *A) C: Cn(p(E) U {A}), 
(Preservation) If 7 A $2 p(E), then Cn(p(E) U {A}) C p(E *A). 
” One of the advantages of our account is that the differences are also made explicit syntactically for 
simpler languages. once the belief revision function used in the models is supplied with adequate constraints 
(see [2.3]). 
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WA-C) U {Al) is usually abbreviated as p(E) + A, where p(E) + A denotes 
the expansion of the belief set p(E) with the sentence A. Inclusion and Preservation 
together entail that when a sentence A is consistent with the belief set p(E), the belief 
set associated with E*A is just the expansion of p(E) with A. A weaker condition has 
also been studied 
(Weak Preservation) If A E p(E), and p(E) is consistent, then p(E) + A C p(E*A). 
There are two questions that one can ask regarding these postulates. One is purely 
formal: what are their conditional counterparts? The second is philosophically relevant: 
are the following postulates adequate to characterize the notion of iterated supposition 
involved in the evaluation of epistemic conditionals? 
4.1. Weak Preservation and Invariance 
The rationality postulates presented in the previous section put some constraints on 
the dynamics of beliefs sets. If A is believed in p(E) and p(E) is consistent, the former 
postulates mandate p(E) = p(E x A), although E and E*A could be different. This is 
a trivial consequence of the fact that a belief set B can be associated with different 
epistemic states. Nevertheless, some authors have suggested that such freedom should 
be curtailed. In fact, one can assume that there is one and only one epistemic state 
associated with a given belief set. Such a constraint can be introduced here via the 
following principle of belief preeminence:24 
(BP) If p(E) = p(E’), then p(E *A) = p(E’ *A). 
BP has been assumed in some theories of suppositional or hypothetical change, 
like the one presented in [24]. 25 BP has also been assumed by other theories modeling 
24 The postulate has been used before under other names. For example, Friedman and Halpern call it 
Propositionality in [ 121. 
25 This statement needs some qualifications. The models of supposition studied in [24] are pairs (B,M), 
where B is a set of potential belief sets and M is a probability measure defined over all potential belief sets 
in B. Levi uses M to determine a measure of informational value. M is what Levi calls an ir~formational- 
value-determining probability function. Independently of the details of Levi’s construction what matters for 
us here is that for every model (B,M), expressions like (K*A) * B are always well defined in Levi’s theory. 
In order to calculate (K*A) * B one starts with K. The fixity of the bf function allows us to calculate 
K *A. Once one is in K * A, again by appealing to the fixed M-function, one can calculate the next revision. 
Revisions are not path dependent. The result of revising a belief set K does not depend on its past history. 
It only depends on K and the M-function used in the model (and, of course, the particular way in which the 
M-function is used in order to construct the change operation *). The unconstrained version of the models 
considered in this paper behave in a very different manner. One can perfectly well have a pair of states E, 
E’ and a sentence A, such that although p(E) = p(E’), P(E* A) is different from p(E’ *A). For example, if 
an epistemic state E is modified by adding a sentence A compatible with p(E), Inclusion and preservation 
will leave p(E) unchanged, but E might change to a different E’. But now, since * is a function that maps 
epistemic states and sentences to epistemic states, the outputs p(E*A) and p(E’*A) might differ - a concrete 
example will be considered later in this section. BP imposes a Markovian condition of path-independence that 
is a natural feature of the models used by Levi. It seems therefore that any reconstruction of Levi’s models 
by appealing to a framework like the one that we are using in this paper, would require the imposition of 
BP. 
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‘real’ change, but we will be mainly concerned here with the former 
application. 
Notice that Weak Preservation and Inclusion entail, in the presence of Belief Pre- 
eminence, the following constraint on iterated change: 
(Invariance) If A E p(E), and p(E) is consistent, then p((E *A) * B) = P(E * B). 
Our presentation of rationality constraints in this and the former section is not stan- 
dard in the belief revision literature. AGM, for example, models belief change opera- 
tions as mappings from belief sets and sentences to belief sets. The emphasis on this 
view is to provide one-step postulates which tell us what properties the next belief set 
ought to have, given the current belief set and the current evidence. If the interpretation 
is suppositional the idea is to provide postulates which tell us which properties a sup- 
positional state ought to have given the current belief set and the current supposition. 
So, if we use B to denote belief sets. Inclusion and Preservation now look as follows: 
(Inclusion) B C Cn(B U {A}) 
(Preservation) If 
When belief change 
them as a theorem: 
lA$B, thenCn(BU{A})CB*A. 
postulates are presented in this form Invariance follows from 
(Invariance’) If A E B, and B is consistent, then (B * A) * C=B * C. 
Even when the idea of the AGM theory is to study one-step postulates, the theory 
does impose some constraints on iteration, like Invariance. The main goal of this section 
is to show that Invariance is not a good constraint on iterated supposing. The following 
example’” will help us to make a case against Invariance: 
Consider a spinner and a dial divided into three equal parts 1, 2, and 3. You (fully) 
believe that the spinner was started and landed in 1. Then you are asked to evaluate: 
(I) If the spinner lands in an odd-numbered part, then if it is not I, it is 3. 
It seems pretty clear that you should say ‘yes’, i.e. that you should accept (I). But 
then it is also obvious that in this situation you should reject: 
(II) If the spinner is not 1, then it is 3. 
There are many examples of this kind. They were first brought to the attention of 
philosophers by Vann McGee in [26]. The examples are interesting because of their 
extreme generality. This is particularly valuable in an area where not even grammatical 
classification is uncontroversial. No one seems to agree about the correct classification 
of conditionals, and few phenomena seem to be valid across the different categories 
available in the literature. The McGee cases are one of these few phenomena. The 
impressive battery of examples exhibited in [26] is enough to convince any skeptic. 
Different morals can be drawn from the examples. One particularly uncontroversial 
moral is to see the examples as showing that a rational agent can perfectly well believe 
” The example is inspired by a similar one proposed in [24] 
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a sentence A as true, and to accept (believe as true) a conditional of the form A > 
(B > C), while he or she might find reasonable to reject the consequent B > C. 
This epistemic reading27 of the McGee cases is all that is needed in order to mount 
a convincing case against the adequacy of Invariance, and therefore against Weak 
Preservation.28 Notice that any invariant extended epistemic model obeys 
(EMP)A, A > (B > C) + B > C. 
Therefore no Invariant theory of iteration can make sense of the McGee cases.29 
What to give up? One option is to give up Belief Preeminence and to preserve 
Inclusion and Preservation. The following section will be devoted to analyze this option. 
More radical conclusions can be obtained by introducing * as a mapping from belief 
sets and sentences to belief sets - as is customary in the AGM tradition. In this 
case Invariance is a direct consequence of Inclusion and Preservation. The immediate 
conclusion is that AGM (in its standard formulation) cannot be a model of supposition. 
One should adopt some weakening of the theory in order to avoid the unpalatable 
consequences induced by Invariance. 
*’ ‘Epistemic reading’ has to be understood here in a very general manner, as applying both to our analysis 
and Gardenfors’. 
28 Van McGee seems to suggest in his essay that he wants to obtain a more ambitious conclusion from 
his examples, His examples show that, if conditionals are truth value carriers, they do not obey in general 
the axiom (A > B) - (A -+ B), where B is itself a conditional. Many objected against this way of 
interpreting the examples. Fortunately, this strong diagnosis of the examples is not needed here. We only 
need the minimal epistemic base used by McGee in order to construct his more ambitious (and controversial) 
argument. 
29A standard maneuver in order to dismiss McGee’s examples is to say that - in these cases - the agent 
who accepts ‘If A, then if B then C’ does not really accept the iterated conditional A > (B > C). What he 
does accept instead is a conditional with a conjunctive antecedent: ((A A B) > C). 
This observation can be interpreted in two possible manners. The first is usual in the literature on prob- 
abilistic semantics of conditionals: the conjunctive re-interpretation of ‘If A, then if B then C’ is just the 
symptom of a more generalized malaise: there are no iterated conditionals at all. This view is coherent, 
but it seems too draconian. It was briefly considered and dismissed in the introduction. 
An anonymous referee reminded me of a second way of making sense of the rebuttal. There are, after 
all, iterated conditionals. A > (B > C) is, under this point of view a legitimate candidate for acceptance. 
Then A > (B > C) and its conjunctive re-interpretation are two syntactic objects used to express certain 
conditional beliefs. Now we are invited to consider that every time that an agent faces a McGee case he 
chooses the sentence A > (B > C) to express a conditional belief that as a matter of fact is not expressed 
by this sentence. What happens is that the agent entertains the conditional belief expressed by ((AM) > C). 
Moreover, he does not accept the conditional belief expressed by the sentence used to reveal the conditional 
belief that he really has (i.e. he rejects the belief expressed by A > (B > C), while he really accepts the 
conditional belief expressed by ((A A B) > C))! This story is difficult to digest given the systematicity 
and generality of the McGee phenomenon. Why this systematic equivocation arises only in McGee cases? 
It seems much less problematic to say that the conditional belief expressed by the English conditional ‘If A, 
then if B then C’ is nlways the conditional belief expressed by the regimented sentence ((A A B) > C). But 
we will see below that this is McGee’s position. In fact, McGee thinks that we assert, believe or accept a 
conditional of the form A > (B > C) whenever we are willing to assert, accept or believe the conditional 
((A A B) > C). Once one accepts the existence of iterated conditionals, the conjunctive move can only be 
part of an explanation of McGee cases, not an instrument used to dismiss them. 
Giving up Belief Preeminence is enough to block Invariance. Moreover, some of the 
theories that abandon BP, can handle McGee’s cases rather well. An example is the 
theory recently proposed by Darwiche and Pearl in [lo]. Darwiche and Pearl impose 
the following postulates on the dynamics of epistemic states in addition to Inclusion 
and Preservation: 
Busic postuhtes 
(Success) A E /I(E * A). 
(Consistency Preservation) P(E *A) is consistent if A is. 
(Equivalence) If E = E’ and A - B, then /I(E * A) = p( E’ * ‘4). 
(Conjunctive revision) If P(E *il) + B is consistent, then Q(E * A ) + B = p( E r ,-I ,? ti ). 
In addition to these basic postulates Darwiche and Pearl impose the following set of’ 
special postulates for iterated revision: 
C-postulutrs 
(C I ) If A entails B, then p((E * B) * A ) = p( E * ,-I ) 
(C2) If A entails +I, then p((E * B) * il) = o(E *A). X’ 
(C3) IfBEp(E*A), thenBtp((E*B)*A). 
(C4) If -B @ p(E *A), then +I @ LH’(.!? * B) *A. 
Several useful examples are discussed in [IO]. For example epistemic states can 
bc encoded as rankings (or ordinal corlditionul $rnctions). A ranking is a function K 
from the set of all interpretations of the underlying language (worlds) into the class 
of ordinals. A ranking is extended to propositions by requiring that the rank of a 
proposition bc the smallest rank assigned to a world that satisfies: 
I<( A) = min,, L -I ti( bv). 
The set of models corresponding to the heliej’ set I)(K) associated with a ranking 
K is the set {W : k(w) = 0). Darwiche and Pearl proved in [lo] that the follouing 
method for updating rankings satisfy their postulates: 
(ti l A)(w) = 
ti(w) - K(A) if w k A. 
x(w) + 1 otherwise. 
It is clear that this method will handle the example of the spinner in a nice manner. 
The following picture shows how to encode the epistemic state of a person that just 
“‘See [4] for comments on the general adequacy of this postulate. 
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saw that the spinner landed in 1 - wl is the ‘world’ representing the fact that the 
spinner landed in 1, and the same goes for 2 and 3. 
ti Possible worlds 
0 wl 
1 w2, w3 
2 Rest of worlds 
And the next two tables show how the rankings evolve when updated by the propo- 
sition Odd = {wl, w3) first (ICI), and then by 11 = {w~,w~}(K~). 
ICI Possible worlds ~2 Possible worlds 
0 wl 0 w3 
1 w3 1 w2, wl 
2 w2 2 Rest of worlds 
While obviously, the result of directly updating K with 1 1 yields 
~3 Possible worlds 
0 w3, w2 
1 wl 
2 Rest of worlds 
Supposing and updating are different kinds of mental acts. While the notion of 
supposing is clearly involved in the evaluation of conditionals, the notion of updating 
is involved in the actual process of changing view. The evaluation of a conditional 
like Odd > (- 1 > 3) requires us to suppose Odd, not to actually change our minds 
in order to accommodate the information that the spinner landed in an odd number. 
The latter change might be modeled in many different ways. For example a body of 
recent literature on non-prioritized revision suggests that, depending on the structure 
of the initial state, not all revisions need to be successful.31 But supposing Odd seems 
to require us to open a ‘suppositional window’ in which one focuses only on Odd 
states. This might be accomplished in many ways, none of which can be encoded via 
an invariant AGM method.32 
Some notable exceptions notwithstanding the notions of supposing and updating have 
been usually conflated in the recent literature. This is surprising because the distinction 
between these two mental acts has considerable philosophical and formal pedigree. J.L. 
Mackie, for example, based his account of conditionals on the notion of supposing, 
which he carefully distinguished from the notion of learning. More recently supposing 
accounts of conditionals have been off‘ered by Cross and Thomason, Collins, Levi, 
3’ Statistically inspired models like the method of routine expansion developed by Isaac Levi in [23] are 
even more liberal. Once an inconsistency is detected, one can question either the input, or the background 
or both. 
3’ If one models change by mapping belief sets and sentences into belief sets; one can directly conclude 
that no AGM method is capable of modeling supposing. 
Skyrms and others.j3 Unfortunately, there is no consensus about the properties that the 
notion of supposing has to have. There is more agreement when it comes to distinguish 
supposing from updating (both formally and conceptually). 
We already saw that operations like Darwiche and Pearl’s could be used to model 
some crucial aspects of supposing. Are they also good models of belief change? This 
is a controversial topic that we prefer not to touch here in detail. If one focuses 
on invariance, for example, the property is not universally imposed by all the recent 
theories of iterated change offered in the literature. For example, Lehmann’s rcccnt 
wvision of belief revision [ 191 imposes Invariance axiomatically (even when the theory 
is formulated in a framework where the postulate could have been abandoned). On the 
other hand, theories like Darwiche and Pearl’s abandon BP and Invariance. 
Consensus about the principles of belief change will be probably hard to obtain 
without anchoring the whole analysis on a broader perspective. For example, some 
authors have justified their views on the basis of an analysis of what arc (or should 
be) the aims of inquiry (a Bayesian perspective has been defended in [23], and a rcli- 
ability view has been offered in [ 181). Alternatively, one can rely on purely pragmatic 
considerations, rather than on what is in general required by rationality. 
While one could argue about the adequacy of the principles of belief change, some 
of these doubts seem highly unmotivated when one focus on supposing. One might 
doubt whether update is successful or imariant. Such doubts seem bizarre in the case 
of supposing. Failure of Invariance and satisfaction of success seem constitutiw of a 
reasonable notion of supposing. 
We can recapitulate here our account of the role of Weak Preservation (WP). Let LIS 
concentrate first on a formulation of change rules as functions on epistcmic states. In 
this case WP entails Invariance in the presence of Belief Preeminence and Inclusion. 
We just saw one way of blocking Invariance, via the rejection of Belief Preeminence. 
This move is not available to researchers who impose Belief Preeminence, or that 
directly model change as functions on belief sets. In this case either WP or Inclusion 
should be given up. Some authors have argued in favor of abandoning WP, by pointing 
out that there are independent reasons for rejecting it. In fact, notice that the conditional 
reflection of Weak Preservation at the unnested level is: 
(WP) (A AB) i (A > B), for A, B E Llr. 
Here is an example presented by Levi in [24] showing the inadequacy of (WP): 
Example 2. (Levi). Suppose agent X is offered a gamble on the outcome of a toss 
of a fair coin where he wins $ 1,000 if the coin lands heads and loses nothing if the 
coin lands tails. Let utility be linear in dollars. The expected value is $ 500. X has 
to choose between this gamble and receive $ 700 for sure. X has foolishly (given his 
beliefs and values) accepted the gamble and won $ 1000. Y points out to him that 
” The main Kefs are [8.9,24,30] 
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his choice was foolish. X denies this. He says: If I had accepted the gamble, I would 
have won $ 1000’. 
Against intuition, the acceptance of the last conditional is mandated by (WP). X 
believes that he accepted the gamble. He also believes that he won $ 1000. Therefore, 
according to (WP), X should accept the conditional in question. Levi has proposed in 
[24] a theory that rejects Weak Preservation. The theory accepts, nevertheless, Belief 
Preeminence. 
There are further reasons not to abandon Inclusion, which we will consider in section 
4.3. Roughly the idea is that one wants the conditional counterparts of the postulate. 
4.2.1. Van McGee on supposing and the role of Consistency Preseroation 
In the previous sections we saw that the theory proposed by Darwiche and Pearl 
can be used to model certain forms of suppositional reasoning. We also considered a 
particular method of change satisfying Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates and we saw 
how it can be used to deal with McGee cases. 
McGee’s own solution to his puzzling examples will be considered in this section. 
We will also show that the notion of supposition presupposed by McGee’s theory 
cannot be modeled by any method obeying Darwiche and Pearl’s axioms. 
It is a familiar fact that the attitudes expressed by A > (B > C) and its conjunctive 
re-interpretation ((A A B) > C) are sometimes difficult to disentangle. Researchers 
unconvinced by the theoretical plausibility of nested conditionals have traditionally 
appealed to this fact to deny that the acceptance of the English conditional ‘If A, then 
if B then C’ is ever related to the acceptance of any iterated conditional. ‘If A, then if B 
then C’ looks like an iterated conditional, but this is just an accident. The acceptance 
of ‘If A, then if B then C’ can always be explained in terms of the acceptance of 
((A A B) > C). 
McGee does accept the existence of nested conditionals. But he explains away the 
embedded conditional by postulating that A > (B > C) and its conjunctive reinterpre- 
tation really express the same attitude. In other words McGee postulates the validity 
Of 
(Export - -1mport)A > (B > C) H ((A A B) > C). 
Then he proves an interesting result showing that accepting Export-Import has the con- 
sequence that either modus ponens fails for conditionals with conditional consequents 
or that the conditional ‘ > ’ is the truth-functional conditional. 
The epistemic counterpart of Export-Import is 
(Export * Import)(E *A) *B = E * (A A B).34 
34 Or its more cautions counterpart: p((E *A) * 5) = p(E * (A A 5)) 
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Export-Import has fairly strong consequences. In the 
port*Import postulate entails: 
presence of success the Ex- 
(GlobalSuccess) A E p((E *A) *B). 
In the presence of Success the Export*Import postulate also leads to violations of 
Consistency Preservation. In fact, consider the case when A is a propositional atom 
and B is 1A. Since Darwiche and Pearl’s theory obeys Consistency Preservation, it IS 
immediate that there is no Export*Import extension of their theory. 
Preserving consistency is indeed one of the main goals of any theory modeling the 
process of updating epistemic states. But consistency preservation need not be an idcal 
governing all forms of suppositional reasoning. Adams, McGee and others tend to 
see supposition as a c.umulatiz;e operation. According to this view (formally expressed 
by Global Success) the act of entertaining (sequentially) two mutually contradictory 
suppositional inputs leads to a contradiction, not a case where the first supposition is 
retracted in virtue of the new one. 35 A formal model of a notion of supposition that 
strictly satisfies the Export*Import condition is offered in [5]. The gist of the proposal 
presented in [5] will be presented below after introducing an example. The example 
will motivate some of the issues discussed throughout the section. It will also be used 
to illustrate the method used in [5]. 
Consider a spinner like the one used in the previous examples. Now the spinner has 
four numbers: 1, 2, 3 and 4. The initial epistemic state is 
Notice that the o-rule sanctions the acceptability of the following conditional with 
respect to this epistemic state: 
ti Possible worlds 
0 M’l, w4 
1 W12, VV3 
2 Rest of worlds 
(1) If the winner lands in an Odd number, then if the number is different from I. 
the number is either 3 or 4. 
The rule also sanctions the acceptability of: 
(2) If the winner lands in an Odd number different from 1, the number is 3. 
Some philosophers and logicians 36 have found reasonable (both systematically and 
pre-systematically) to link rigidly the acceptance conditions of (2) and 
” This view has also been favored by researchers workin g in ~nherifunce nc~tworks. See Section 3 of [9] 
“J. Collins, D. Edgington, F. Jackson, V. McGee and M. Woods should be counted among the theorctl- 
cians who have defended the Export*Import rule. Without plungmg too deeply into Byzantine LTammatical 
distinctions it should be said that only a subset of these authors think that the rule applies universally to 
all kind of conditionals. All of them think that it applies to some classes of conditionals. The scope of 
applicability varies according to the classification adopted. The two salient candidates arc imiicati~c,.~ and 
/~~~potheticcr/.s. The conditionals used in our example fall under both categories. 
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(3 ) If the winner lands in an Odd number, then if the number is different from 1. 
the number is 3. 
But the straight application of the o-rule recommends to accept (2), and (1) and to 
reject (3). The acceptance of (1) illustrates a failure of global success. The supposition 
Odd is not held fix throughout the evaluation of (1). 
The basic idea behind Export*Import is that (2) and (3) express the same attitude. 
Notice also how different is (3) from: 
(3’) If I were to revise my epistemic state by Odd and then subsequently by 1 1, 
then I would believe that the winner is 3. 
(3’) should be rejected, but (3) should be accepted (and (1) rejected). The attitude of 
supposing that A is the case should not be conflated with the attitude of supposing that 
the current view has been updated after learning A. The second type of suppositional 
state is needed to evaluate (3’), while the first is needed to evaluate (3).” 
Here is a different manner of making sense of the acceptability of (3). Say that the 
initial epistemic state is K. Then supposing Odd can be modeled as the act of opening 
a ‘suppositional window’ that only includes Odd-options. This suppositional window 
should preserve as much as possible of the structure encoded in the initial ranking . 
For example it does not seem plausible to alter the ordering of worlds induced by K. 
So, our first act of supposing will lead us to focus on: 
K’ Possible worlds 
0 wl 
1 w3 
2 Rest of worlds 
Now, when we suppose 11, with respect to K’, we get the desired result. This 
way of characterizing the notion of change involved in the evaluation of conditionals 
guarantees the property of Global Success suggested in the previous section. The items 
supposed at any point in a chain of suppositions are firmly maintained until the end 
of the process. 
The formal account presented in [5] does not appeal to rankings. Nevertheless, the 
operation can be defined in terms of rankings. We need a different characterization 
of rankings. In our previous characterization we defined rankings as mappings from 
the set of all interpretation of the underlying language into the class of ordinals. We 
will appeal now to a different characterization according to which rankings are un- 
derstood as mappings from a set S of interpretations of the language to the class of 
ordinals. The ranking induced by the empty set of worlds is the inconsistent ranking 
“.f . 
37 Note also that (3) and (3’) seem to have different logical form. It is very difficult to turn (3’) into a 
nested conditional. It seems more natural to see (3’) as a simple (unnested) conditional with a temporal 
‘and then’ connective in the antecedent. 
If S n A # Co the rank assigned to A-worlds is determined in the usual way I&VA 
= ti(w) - K(A). No -A world is assigned a rank. If S Ti A = @, ti@A = xl. 
Of course Consistency Preservation fails in this setting. Assume that S is nonempty 
and A is consistent. Say that our initial epistemic state is a ranking K such that i)( K ) 
is non empty. When S n A = v), ti@A = K/, violating Consistency Preservation. 
Moreover. for every sentence B, ( K@A )@B = tii. 
It is worth noting that the example considered above illustrates a case where the 
suppositional inputs are mutually consistent. Informal analysis of conditionals defending 
the Export*Import rule tend to focus on cases of these kind. This might be justified by 
the empirical fact that nested English conditionals with contradictory antecedents arc 
rare and hardly intelligible. 
4.3. Inclusion 
What about Inclusion? The natural unnested conditional counterpart of Inclusion is 
(CMP) A > B 4 (A + B). with A, B E Lo 
Does this run against McGee examples? The answer is no. The McGee casts show the 
inadequacy of any theory of supposition inducing the validity of a conditional axiom of 
the form CMP where B itself is a conditional. But CMP is a perfectly sound conditional 
axiom that one wants to preserve. The axioms that one does not want to ha\,e is: 
(IMP) (A > B) --i (A + B). with A E Lo, and B t L .\L,,. 
But it is easy to check that IMP is not validated by inclusion in the context of 
our theory. Moreover in [3] is shown that there are no non-trivial epistemic models 
validating IMP. We will see in the following sections that the notion of acceptance 
characterized by the BRMs behaves in a very different manner. 
4.4. Int:ariatwt~ und Inclusion in the context of the BRMs 
The argument of this section can be summarized as follows: the BRMs deliver an 
inadequate theory of iteration, because every inclusive BRM also obeys EMP. 
Notice that any notion of change compatible with (GRT) is monotonic 
(K * M) If p(E) C p(H), then p(E *A) & p(H + A). 
Consider now the following weak version of Invariance: 
p((E *A) * B) C p(E * B). if A E p(E), and p(E) is consistent. 
Remark 3. Any monotonic and inclusive notion of change is weakly invariant. 
Proof. Assume that A E p(E), and p(E) is consistent. By Inclusion: P(E * ‘4) C 
Cn(p(E) U {A}) = p(E). Therefore, by (K *M), p((E * A) * B) C p(E *B) 0 
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It is important to note that all the theories of change that have been proposed in the 
literature in order to give epistemic models of the possible worlds conditionals obey 
(K*M). Good examples are [17,8]. These notions of change are qualitative versions of 
Lewis’ imuging, a notion of change that imposes monotonicity at the qualitative level. 
So, the defenders of (GRT), and more generally the defenders of imaging, cannot give 
up (K *M). Then the only option is to give up Inclusion. But this is tantamount to 
giving up also 
(CMP)A > B + (A + B), with A, B E 150. 
The problem is that there is no good reason to do so. Any defender of a notion of 
acceptance as ‘believing true’ should say that every rational agent who believes that 
both A and A > B are true, should also believe that B is true. Therefore, the account 
of acceptance of iterated conditionals using BRMs faces the following dilemma: either 
the models are constrained by Inclusion to have CMP, and then they are unable to 
deal with the McGee cases; or they are sensible to them, by relinquishing the unnested 
version of conditional modus ponens. This is a dilemma that all BRMs face, even the 
ones that are not weakly preservative - like the one developed in [8]. 
It is hard to see how to escape from such a dilemma. It seems that the BRMs 
face insurmountable problems to give an adequate analysis of iteration. According to 
many, the main defect of the epistemic account (using EMS) is its inability to give an 
adequate picture of iteration, while the BRMs are naturally suited to deal with iteration. 
Nevertheless, a more careful analysis of this idea shows that natural extensions of the 
stratified tests deliver a more adequate picture of iteration than the one given in terms 
of the BRMs. 
5. Conclusion 
The paper proposes a full treatment of iterated epistemic conditionals. A representa- 
tion result is given for models that allow for iteration, but that do not prescribe especial 
constraints on the notion of supposition used in the models. We verified that even at 
this basic level, the theory departs from (deceptively) similar accounts, like the one 
done in terms of Belief Revision Models. 
More substantial remarks about the notion of supposition involved in the evaluation 
of conditionals are offered in the last section. We concluded that a notion of iterated 
supposing (unlike the corresponding notion of iterated update)38 cannot be Invariant, 
and we provided several arguments against Weak Preservation.This suggests that no- 
tions like AGM are not good candidates as an axiomatization of supposition. Other 
AGM axioms, like Inclusion, are adequate in the context of our theory. Surprisingly 
3x Here ‘update’ refers to the actual process of changing view, not to the method of change proposed by 
Katsuno and Mendelzon. 
we verified, that every inclusive BRM is also invariant. This fact raises doubts about 
the adequacy of the BRMs for modelling iterated conditionals. 
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-4ppendix A. Proofs 
Theorem 1. A L , ,fbrmuh A is calid if A is a theouw in L CM 
Proof. (Soundness): It is immediate to verify the validity of Z, CC, and to check that 
the rules of inference preserve validity. The validity of F can be proved by induction 
on the complexity of formulae of .+z%. 
(Completeness): To show the converse we will assume that a sentence Y of L . . IS 
not a theorem in &CM and we will show that 2 is not supported by some epistemic 
state E of some epistemic model (E. p.s, *). So, in the following we will construct 
explicitly an 6 CM model (E, p,s, *) and we will exhibit an E E E, such that Y does 
not belong to s(E). 
Some preliminary terminology: a sentence A is a theorem of a conditional logic 
L (usually written FL) A) just in case A E L. A is dwirahle in L from a set of 
sentences if and only if the set contains sentences Al,. ..A,, (n # 0) such that and 
k,_ (A, A A A,,) - A. A set of sentences in L is consistnrt .just in case not cvcry 
sentence is L-derivable from it. 
Form now a list of all formulae of L, of the shape -(il > B): yl, ~2.. ., (lit.. .Wc 
suppose that each L,-sentence of the shape -(A > B) occurs at least once in this list. 
Now, with respect to this list, we construct an infinite sequence of sets: 
k,, II . . ., 1 i,,. 
as follows. As lo we take &CM U (1~). Then, for each positive integer n WC set 
I 
~ (L,.g,.~I if Z;,Y,~I is consistent in B CM. 
ILI ~ 
11, otherwise. 
Set now: Cn(@) = c(UI, ), where IJI, denotes the union of all the infinitely many 
sets I,. 
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The following series of sets of ordered pairs of sets can be constructed. We will 
adopt the following notation. Given an ordered pair K = (B, C), where B C: Lo and C 
5 L,: K, =C,K,, = B. 
Ko = {(WB) n Lo3 Cn(0))) 
K ,I+, = K,, u {({C E Lo : A > C E KS}, {C E L, : A > C E K,}) : K E K,, 
A EL,} U {(WK, U {A}),C(K U {A})) : K E K,,,A E LO}. 
We have now enough elements to define E, and the functions p, s and *. 
(1) E = u K,, 
(2) For all E E E, p(E) = E,, 
(3) For all E E E, s(E) = E,,, 
(4) (E,,,E,) * A = ({C E Lo : A > C E E,,},{C EL, : A > C E E,y}). 
We should verify now that (E, y, s, *) is an EM. 
First we will check that for all E E E, s(E) is a consistent conditional support 
set containing all the theorems of QCM, and that s(E) is complete with regard to 
formulae of the shape A > B E L, (i.e. for all E E E, either A > B E s(E) or 
7(A > B) E s(E)). By construction the claim is true for K(J, which only contains the 
pair (Cn(0) n Lo,Cn(B)). 
Now suppose that all pair of sets in K,, have these properties. Then we want to show 
that all pairs in K,+, also have these properties. 
We should check that for all E in Ku+, , s(E) = {{C E L, : A > C E I&}: 
K E K,, A E L, } is a consistent conditional support set containing all theorems of 
&CM, complete with respect of sentences of the shape A > B E L,. 
First consistency. Assume by contradiction s(E) is inconsistent, for some E E K,,+i. 
Then, C, 7C ~9% belong to S(E). Therefore A > C, A > -C are in K,, for some 
K in K,,. Since by inductive hypothesis (IH from now on) K, is a conditional support 
set containing all dCM-theorems, ‘(A > C) E I& (axiom F), against the assumed 
consistency of K,,. 
Secondly we will show that s(E) is a conditional support set. It is easy to see that 
s(E) is non-empty (because, by (Z), A > T E K,T). By (CC) and IH, if A,B E L, 
belong to s(E), AA B E s(E). Finally, if C + B E C (0) and C E s(E), since 
A > C E K,, by RCM (and IH) we have that A > B E K,, and therefore B E s(E). 
Thirdly for completeness, assume that B > C E L,, is such that B > C +! s(E). 
Then A > (B > C) 6 K,. Since K, is complete, -l(A > (B > C)) E K,, and since 
all theorems of 8CM are in K,, A > -(B > C) t K,. Therefore l(B > C) E s(E). 
Finally, we should check that for all z, such that r E &CM, z E s(E). Note that 
T + t E &CA4 and that therefore (A > T ) + (A > z) is also an &CM-thesis. 
By axiom (I), therefore, A > z E &CM. So A > z E K,%, and r E s(E) as one 
wants. 
It is easy to check that for all E in K,,, p(E) is a belief set (by using appropriate 
instances of axioms (I), (CC) and the rule of inference RCM). 
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It is also easy to check now that the Ramsey clauses are obeyed. If B E p(E*A), 
with B E LO, E E E, then A > B E s(E), and, since s(E) is consistent, T(A > B) @ 
s(E). 
If A > B e s(E), then B E p(E*A), by definition. If l(A > B) E s(E), consistency 
requires A > B @ s(E) and therefore B $ p(E*A). Finally if B 6 p(E*A), A > B t$ 
s(E), and by completeness of s(E) with regard of formulae of this shape, +A > B) 
ci s(E). An almost identical strategy is needed to check the case p = s. 
WC need now to check that constraint (cl ) is satisfied. This also will be done 
by induction. Ko contains only the pair: (Cn(@) n Lo. Cn(@)), which satisfies (cl ) by 
construction. 
Assume now, by IH, that (cl) is satisfied by all K E K,,. We will then prove that 
the constraint (c 1) is satisfied by all the pairs E in K,,,, 
Our first target will be the expansions in EXP = { (Cn(K,, U {A}),C(K, lJ {A} )j : 
K E K,,,A E LO}. We need to check that for all B E Lo,B is in Cn(K,,U {A}) whenever 
R is in C(K,U{A}). So, assume that B is in C(K,b{A}). Then (by assumed properties 
of C) A - B E C(K,,) = K,. But then, by IH, B c K,,, which, in turn, entails that 
B t C(K,, U {A}), and we are done. 
Secondly we should check the revisions in K,,_ , . Notice that for all E in K,, /. C 
in LO and A in L, , if C E s(E), then A > C t K,. But then it is immediate. by 
construction, that C is in p(E) - because Lo is included in L j 
The constraint (~2) is trivially guaranteed by construction in the case of the revisions 
in K,,, I. With regard to expansions, take any E = (Cn(K,, U {A}), C(K, U {A} )). By IH 
K,, C KY,. But by the monotonicity of the underlying notion of consequence C : p(E) = 
Cn(K,, U {A}) = C(K,, U {A}) C C(K, d {A}) = s(E). 7 
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